Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Practical Steps Taken at Security Summit

March 24, 2014 | Edited by Lauren Mladenka and Geoff Wilson

Japanese give up (part of) stockpile - “Japan will announce Monday that it will turn over to Washington more than 700 pounds of weapons-grade plutonium and a large quantity of highly enriched uranium, a decades-old research stockpile that is large enough to build dozens of nuclear weapons,” report Michael Shear and David Sanger for The New York Times.

--“The announcement is the biggest single success in President Obama’s five-year-long push to secure the world’s most dangerous materials, and will come as world leaders gather [at the Hague] on Monday for a nuclear security summit meeting. Since Mr. Obama began the meetings with world leaders — this will be the third — 13 nations have eliminated their caches of nuclear materials and scores more have hardened security at their storage facilities to prevent theft by potential terrorists.”

--“The nuclear fuel being turned over to the United States, which is of American and British origin, is a fraction of Japan’s overall stockpile. Japan has more than nine tons of plutonium stored in various locations and it is scheduled to open in the fall a new nuclear fuel plant that could produce many tons more every year.” Read the full report here. http://nyti.ms/1jkF1EA

Tweet - @NSCPress: FACT SHEET: Advancing Global Nuclear Security. #NSS2014 http://t.co/3uZdPTkztI

Too much “stuff” - “World leaders at the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague this week are there because, as comedian George Carlin would say, we have too much ‘stuff,’” writes Joseph Cirincione in Defense One. “In this case it’s nuclear stuff that can blow up the world.”

--“In 2010, President Obama hosted the first nuclear security summit in Washington. The goal is to get states, large and small, to lock up their nuclear stuff more tightly and eliminate as much of it as possible. The summits are the most successful arm of Obama’s nuclear agenda, but even here his administration has fallen short of the president’s goals… Obama had pledged in Prague in 2009, and again at the first summit in 2010, to secure all nuclear materials within four years and to set new standards for their security. His administration has done neither. There are still hundreds of sites in 25 nations with this nuclear material. We have a patchwork of policies, rather than legally-binding requirements or agreed standards for all nations storing this stuff.

--“We are going in the right direction. When you are fleeing a forest fire, however, it is not a question of direction but of speed. Can we get to safety before disaster overwhelms us? The current pace is only sporadically urgent. Worse, there is a real chance that even this cooperation will cease after the final, planned summit in 2016.” Full article and recommendations here. http://bit.ly/ONMvSK

Preventing nuclear terrorism - “Nuclear terrorism is one of the most serious threats of the 21st century,” writes Carl Robichaud in The Hill. “Fortunately, the threat is a preventable one: consolidate and lock down weapons-usable materials and you dramatically reduce the risks.”

--Recommendation for the summit: “Obama should lead a shift in the conversation away from short-term fixes and toward a more comprehensive approach that emphasizes the shared responsibilities of all states. The long-term goal should be to codify the current web of voluntary initiatives and agreements, while establishing legally binding requirements for unaddressed vulnerabilities. This won’t be easy, since many states resist any steps that are seen as compromising their sovereignty. Nevertheless, an effective nuclear security system must secure dangerous nuclear materials, assess how well states meet those standards, and provide assistance through the IAEA to states that need it. Nuclear security is far too important to rely on an ad-hoc approach that focuses on a select few countries of concern.” Full article here. http://bit.ly/1giwv5N

Dangers of HEU - The first two Nuclear Security Summits “played a critical role in phasing out the use of highly enriched uranium as fuel in research reactors to prevent its misuse by states or terrorists to make nuclear weapons,” write Alan Kuperman and Frank Von Hippel in The New York Times. “But the previous conclaves have failed to address the single largest use of such fuel: in nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers. At this summit, world powers must take an important first step toward ending that dangerous and unnecessary practice.”

--”Mr. Obama deserves praise for initiating the biannual nuclear summits in 2010. But the process has reached mainly for low-hanging fruit,” say Kuperman and Von Hippel. “A more worthy goal would be the worldwide elimination of highly enriched uranium for reactor fuel, which could sharply reduce risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.” Read the full article here. http://nyti.ms/1gtUsbk

Missing materials and the NSS - “About 140 cases of missing or unauthorized use of nuclear and radioactive material were reported to the U.N. atomic agency in 2013, highlighting the challenges facing world leaders at a nuclear security summit next week,” Fredrik Dahl reports for Reuters. “Any loss or theft of highly enriched uranium, plutonium or different types of radioactive sources is potentially serious as al Qaeda-style militants could try to use them to make a crude nuclear device or a so-called ‘dirty bomb’, experts say.” Read the full report here. http://reut.rs/1kXMhUb

Nuclear negligence - “Negligence was involved in all 73 incidents last year in which radioactive substances reported went missing, concludes a new expert report on nuclear trafficking. The report finding by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies could suggest there is much work yet to be done in international efforts to improve security around radiological substances that might be seized by terrorists and used to construct a so-called ‘dirty bomb.’” Read the full report from Rachel Oswald of Global Security Newswire here. http://bit.ly/ONOAhz

Doomsday caucus prevails - “The Pentagon is halting an environmental assessment related to intercontinental ballistic missiles, including those at Malmstrom Air Force Base, officials announced Thursday. The environmental assessment has been a sticking point between the Department of Defense and Congress over the last year. In February, the Pentagon said the DOD was moving forward with the study, though the omnibus spending bill passed by Congress in January prohibited the study.” Read the full report from Jenn Rowell of the Great Falls Tribune here. http://gftrib.com/1iupmPz

Recipe for success - “As the latest round of nuclear talks between Iran and the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) came to a close here in Vienna, one thing stood out above all else: the two sides are equally invested in building a recipe for success,” writes Reza Marashi in the Huffington Post. “Contrary to popular assumption, there are solutions for all of the technical problems that must be solved to reach a comprehensive deal. As negotiations continue into the summer and approach the finish line, the true challenge will be twofold: mustering the political will necessary to take 'yes' for an answer, and crafting a win-win framework that allows both sides to sell the deal in their respective capitals.” Full piece here. http://huff.to/NK1pbs

Tweet - @Cirincione: Amazing graphic presentation of nuclear history timeline from @hcssnl! #NKS2014 http://bit.ly/1g6rzvM

Counterfactuals - “As the Crimea crisis steadily worsens, many have floated the counterfactual: what if Ukraine hadn’t given up its nuclear weapons?” writes Adam Elkus in a piece for War on the Rocks. “This is an exercise in counterfactual inference—and an awfully faulty one. Indeed “the assumption that the Russians would have tolerated a nuclear Ukraine is a big one to swallow… When we think through the entire counterfactual, we see that there are plausible outcomes in which Russia would have taken preventive action to secure its arsenal by force… For all we know, it might be far worse!” Read the full piece here. http://bit.ly/1jvBvms

Quick-hit:

--“Russia, Sanctions, and Politics in Iran” by Paul Pillar in The National Interest. http://bit.ly/1gRFxly

Events:

--“Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers.” Book launch with Mark Fitzpatrick. March 26 from 10:00-11:00 at IISS-US, 2121 K St. NW, suite 801. RSVP here. http://bit.ly/1fUo3Vy

--“Implications on Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in South Asia.” Discussion with Jeffrey McCausland. March 26 from 12:30-2:30 at the Stimson Center, 1111 19th St. NW, 12th floor. RSVP here. http://bit.ly/1kBZQbR

--“Separated Plutonium: Friend or Foe?” Discussion with Andrew Worrall. March 26 from 4:00-5:30 at George Washington University, room 111, 1957 E St. NW. RSVP here. http://bit.ly/1kXIZjN

--“Thermonuclear Monarchy: Choosing Between Democracy and Doom.” Discussion with Elaine Scarry. March 27 from 5:00-7:00 at George Washington University, room 505, 1957 E St. NW. RSVP here. http://bit.ly/1psdNJx

--“Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Initiative and its Relationship to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” Discussion with Ira Helfand and Guakhar Mukhatzhanova. March 31 from 9:30-11:30 at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW. RSVP here. http://bit.ly/NxfOaY

--“Creating a Legacy for the Nuclear Security Summit.” Discussion with Kenneth Luongo and Sharon Squassoni. April 2 from 12:00-1:30 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2nd floor conference room A, 1616 Rhode Island Ave. NW. RSVP by email to PPP@csis.org