Hagel Orders Sweeping Review of Troubled Nuclear Force

January 24, 2014 | Edited by Lauren Mladenka and Geoff Wilson

Hagel responds - Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has “ordered immediate actions to define the depth of trouble inside the nuclear force, particularly the Air Force's intercontinental ballistic missile force, which has been rocked by disclosures about security lapses, poor discipline, weak morale and other problems that raise questions about nuclear security,” writes Robert Burns for the AP. “Personnel failures within this force threaten to jeopardize the trust the American people have placed in us to keep our nuclear weapons safe and secure,” wrote Hagel to top Pentagon officials.

--In response, “Hagel summoned top military officials to a Pentagon conference, to be held within two weeks, to ‘raise and address’ any personnel problems infesting the nuclear force, and he ordered an ‘action plan’ be written within 60 days to explore nuclear force personnel issues, identify remedies and put those fixes into place quickly.” Sec. Hagel also said that “he would assemble a small group of outsiders with expertise in the nuclear field to conduct a broader review of the U.S. nuclear force, with a focus on personnel issues, and to recommend changes.”

--“The weapons are an enormous responsibility for the military, not just to operate them properly but also to ensure they are safe and secure. Critics question whether it is worth the cost,” writes Burns. Read the full report here. http://apne.ws/1aPgPE0

A longstanding problem - “Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has ordered a full review of the Pentagon’s nuclear mission — the second in six years — in response to the alleged cheating and drug rings inside the Air Force’s ballistic missile units,” writes Philip Ewing for Politico.

-- “Hagel’s reviews are a play for time in order to determine how to solve a problem the Pentagon already understands well. Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger’s 2008 nuclear study, ordered by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates after the Air Force’s last round of public nuclear weapons embarrassments, documented plummeting esprit within the ICBM force and a sense of abandonment compared to the Air Force’s fighter and bomber units. Gates responded by firing the chief and secretary of the Air Force, and other lower-level commanders also lost their jobs. The service created Global Strike Command to take the place of the legendary former Strategic Air Command and has tried to restore missileers’ sense of importance, but Kirby acknowledged the Air Force appears to have fallen short.”

--“What Hagel’s review apparently will not do is question the overall wisdom of maintaining the current nuclear triad of Air Force missiles, bombers and Navy ballistic missile submarines. Kirby has said that Hagel is committed to the triad, although as a longtime nuclear opponent, he would probably welcome some eventual reduction in the total number of U.S. nuclear weapons.” Get the full story here. http://politi.co/M2ixJE

New nuclear capability - “The former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, confirmed last week that the B61-12 nuclear bomb planned by the Obama administration will have improved military capabilities to attack targets with greater accuracy and less radioactive fallout,” writes Hans Kristensen. “The confirmation is important because the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) pledged that nuclear warhead ‘Life Extension Programs…will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.’”

--“In addition to violating the NPR pledge, enhancing the nuclear capability contradicts U.S. and NATO goals of reducing the role of nuclear weapons and could undermine efforts to persuade Russia to reduce its non-strategic nuclear weapons posture.” Read the piece from the Federation of American Scientists. http://bit.ly/1mQN9LP

Scuttling the deal - “The new Iran sanctions bill sets out impractical demands for the still-to-be-negotiated comprehensive deal,” write Sanford Gottlieb and Daryl Kimball. “Iran and the P5+1 powers have already agreed that the final phase deal will include a ‘mutually defined enrichment program’ for Iran. But S. 1881 would only allow the suspension of sanctions if Iran agrees to zero-enrichment and the complete dismantlement of its nuclear infrastructure,” effectively reopening the terms of the first phase agreement and imposing unrealistic restrictions.

--“The threat of further U.S. sanctions would also undermine support inside Iran for nuclear restraint. Iranian hardliners, who already oppose the nuclear deal, will likely take retaliatory steps and make it harder for Iran's President, Hassan Rouhani, to agree to further limits on Iran's nuclear program,” Gottlieb and Kimball say. “As a result, talks on a comprehensive deal would likely collapse, Iran's nuclear activities would accelerate, bringing it closer to being able to produce nuclear weapons, and the risk of an Israeli military attack on Iran's nuclear sites would grow.” Read the full article in The Baltimore Sun. http://bit.ly/1itMVtM

Better choice - “A final deal prohibiting all uranium enrichment [in Iran] would be ideal, but it’s not a realistic option,” writes Kingston Reif for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. “The choice is not between the Geneva pact and a perfect agreement under which Iran permanently suspends all enrichment. Tehran has made it abundantly clear that zero enrichment is a non-starter. It has invested far too much in its program to turn back now. Rather, the choice is between the Geneva agreement and a status quo in which there are no constraints on Iran’s ability to produce weapons-usable nuclear material without detection.”

--“That’s why the Obama administration’s approach is the right one. A realistic final-stage agreement would significantly constrain Iran’s enrichment program, greatly increase the international community’s ability to monitor and verify compliance, and give the United States and its allies ample warning in the event that Iran made a ‘dash’ to acquire the bomb,” Reif says. “Insisting on zero enrichment at the outset, on the other hand, would likely doom diplomatic efforts, thereby increasing the likelihood of unconstrained Iranian nuclear development, a nuclear-armed Iran, a US war against Iran, or all of the above—and not necessarily in that order.” Full article here. http://bit.ly/1bmvbJ6

Curbing North Korea - “U.S. Deputy Secretary of State William Burns has called for China to boost bilateral cooperation so North Korea can take ‘meaningful and early steps’ to give up its nuclear ambitions, according to a U.S. statement released on Thursday,” the Yonhap News Agency reports. Get the full story here. http://bit.ly/1dULeDK

Iran commentary -

--“Congress, don't pass the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act” by Steven Spiegel in The Hill. http://bit.ly/1aPgwcC

--“Congress should steer clear of tougher Iran sanctions” by Darlene Hooley and Maiya Zwerling in The Oregonian. http://bit.ly/KUpknU

--“The hawks’ hypocrisy on the Iran sanctions bill” by Peter Beinart in The Atlantic. http://bit.ly/1aRUv9N

Events:

--”Resolved: The United States Should Modernize Only One Leg of the Nuclear Triad.” Debate with Christopher Preble and Elbridge Colby. Jan. 27th from 6:00-8:00 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. RSVP here. http://bit.ly/L7utt2

--”Implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal.” Hearing of the House Joint Subcommittee Hearing, featuring Mark Wallace, Gregory Jones, Olli Heinonen, and David Albright. Jan. 28th at 2:00 pm in Rayburn 2172. http://1.usa.gov/1c7lQZM

Dessert:

Dr. Strangelove, for real - “This month marks the fiftieth anniversary of Stanley Kubrick’s black comedy about nuclear weapons, ‘Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb.’ Released on January 29, 1964, the film caused a good deal of controversy. Its plot suggested that a mentally deranged American general could order a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, without consulting the President.”

--“Although ‘Strangelove’ was clearly a farce… Half a century after Kubrick’s mad general, Jack D. Ripper, launched a nuclear strike on the Soviets to defend the purity of ‘our precious bodily fluids’ from Communist subversion, we now know that American officers did indeed have the ability to start a Third World War on their own. And despite the introduction of rigorous safeguards in the years since then, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation hasn’t been completely eliminated.” Read the full story from Eric Schlosser in The New Yorker here. http://nyr.kr/1dS5vtC

PALs - “Until the mid-nineteen-sixties, few of America’s nuclear weapons contained a locking device. Anyone who got hold of a weapon might be able to detonate it. The introduction of [Permissive action links] was intended, among other things, to reinforce Presidential control over the nuclear arsenal of the United States,” writes Eric Schlosser in a post for The New Yorker. Read the full compilation of recently disclosed government letters concerning the battle over whether or not to install PALs on US nuclear missiles here. http://nyr.kr/1itWCIP