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Building a safe, secure, nuclear weapon-free world requires redoubling efforts to resolve regional conflicts and build the capacity to prevent them, especially conflicts that could lead to the spread or use of nuclear weapons. Many countries are currently at risk of proliferation, while others – Australia, Canada, Mexico, Brazil – will continue to be necessary and powerful advocates for eliminating nuclear weapons.
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The Transformation of U.S. Nuclear Policy
Joseph Cirincione
President Barack Obama pledged in Prague on April 5, 2009, to pursue “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” Key treaties, negotiations, and conferences in 2010 will demonstrate whether he can surmount the many political obstacles and deliver on his pledge to develop a new U.S. strategy to reduce rising nuclear dangers.
Nonproliferation Treaty - Fact Sheet
Background
The 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the backbone of the international regime to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Today 189 countries are parties to the NPT, and the treaty’s nonproliferation norms enjoy near-universal support.
Parties to the NPT are split into two categories—nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). The recognized NWS are the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom. Only India, Pakistan and Israel have never signed the NPT, while North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2003.
Every five years a review conference is held to determine compliance, past implementation and ways to strengthen the NPT. The 2005 Review Conference was an unbridled disaster, which undermined support for the nonproliferation regime. Success at the 2010 Review Conference, beginning 3 May, will be essential to strengthen efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and advance nuclear disarmament.
Purpose
The core of the NPT is a set of principles to stop proliferation and encourage disarmament:
- States with nuclear weapons commit to eliminating their arsenals, and agree to not spread nuclear weapons or the means to acquire them to other states.
- States without nuclear weapons promise not to seek or acquire them.
- In return, each state has the right to pursue and use peaceful nuclear technology.
- The treaty also charges the IAEA with inspecting nuclear energy facilities, provides for safeguards for the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and allows for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.
Major Issues
A critical issue before the NPT is that states with nuclear weapons are criticized for ignoring their commitment to disarm, while non-weapons states are criticized for not doing enough to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and materials. To solve this, disarmament and nonproliferation should be seen as two sides of the same coin. If non-weapons states make progress on controlling proliferation, weapons states will feel more comfortable about reducing stockpiles. Reducing stockpiles will build the cooperation needed among non-weapons states to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. In this context, a follow-on START treaty, the entry into force of the CTBT and other disarmament agreements may be vital for the health of the NPT, as will further export controls and safety protocols.
Countries that possess nuclear weapons, but are not signatories to the NPT – India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea - create a difficult double standard. Exempt from the NPT’s legal constructs, these states developed weapons programs with little punishment and are not required to accept IAEA safeguards, leaving nuclear facilities under-protected. Drawing these states into the NPT or a verification and safeguards regime is a serious political and legal challenge for the treaty and its parties.
North Korea recently demonstrated a weakness in the NPT when it withdrew from the treaty and conducted two nuclear tests. Efforts to punish these actions and convince North Korea to dismantle its program and return to the NPT have been unsuccessful. Making withdrawal from the treaty a more serious offense and deterring future proliferators is a priority for NPT parties.
Preventing proliferation while guaranteeing NPT parties’ right to peaceful nuclear technology is another area of concern. Many countries are pursuing peaceful nuclear energy programs, but others – like Iran - may be developing weapons under the veil of the NPT’s universal right to explore peaceful nuclear technology. Fortifying safeguards that prevent energy programs from becoming weapons programs will be an important initiative for parties to the NPT.
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty - Fact Sheet
Background
The Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) was an agreement between the United States and Russia to reduce nuclear weapons and the vehicles on which they can be delivered. That important treaty is now expired, and the Obama administration is working diligently to negotiate a new treaty to continue nuclear reductions.
Originally proposed by President Reagan, START was signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1991. The treaty limited the U.S. and Russia to 1,600 strategic delivery vehicles each – including long-range weapons on missiles, submarines and bombers. This reduced the number of strategic warheads each side could deploy to 6,000 – down from Cold War highs of tens of thousands. The treaty’s robust inspections regime was the cornerstone of stability between the former Cold War rivals.
Both the U.S. and Russia met the 5 December 2001 deadline for completed reductions and continued beyond the mandated levels. The two parties sought additional agreements, ratifying START II in 1996 and agreeing on a framework for START III in 1997, though neither agreement took effect. During its tenure, the Bush administration chose to not pursue START dialogues. Instead, the administration negotiated reductions through the unverifiable 2003 SORT Treaty, while allowing START and its crucial inspections regime to lapse.
START expired on 5 December 2009. Teams from the U.S. and Russia are currently negotiating a follow-on treaty to reduce the number of delivery vehicles and strategic weapons to even lower levels – likely around 1,500 deployed strategic warheads and 800 delivery vehicles. Ratification for a START follow-on agreement will require a two-thirds majority in the U.S. Senate.
Purpose
Today, the U.S. and Russia possess nearly 96% of the world’s nuclear weapons - 9,400 and 12,000 warheads, respectively. These obese nuclear arsenals are a liability, not an asset. These arsenals increase the chance that a nuclear missile could, through accident or miscalculation, be launched at a world city. Additionally, with each warhead comes the risk that nuclear weapons or materials could fall into terrorist hands – resulting in a nuclear 9/11.
There is great opportunity and urgency for the U.S. and Russia to reduce their arsenals. Doing so would improve international security and provide the necessary leadership to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and work towards a nuclear-free world. Under the original START agreement, the U.S. and Russia removed more than 80% of their deployed strategic nuclear weapons. The new START treaty will rebuild and update the previous treaty’s verifications regime, improving security and transparency between the U.S. and Russia.
Major Issues
Winning a two-thirds majority in the Senate will be a battle. Some conservative senators, lead by Arizona Republican Senator Jon Kyl, are linking their vote on the new START treaty to more money, modernization, or even a new warhead for the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
Misconceptions about the new START treaty and U.S. missile defenses have been a political hazard for the treaty. While the new treaty will not limit missile defenses, its language may acknowledge a relationship between such defenses and further nuclear reductions. Opponents of President Obama’s arms control agenda have used this language to falsely charge that Russia is demanding that the U.S. must abandon its missile defense plans to move a new START agreement forward. This is a disingenuous argument, but it will be a formidable political hurdle during the ratification process in the U.S. Senate.
The Obama Transformation: Can it Succeed?
Joe Cirincione
President Barack Obama has one of the most comprehensive, progressive and ambitious arms control and disarmament agendas every proposed by a U.S. president. With his joint statement with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on April 1, 2009and his speech in Prague on April 5, President Obama began the transformation of U.S. nuclear policy. Implementing this agenda, however, will require the president to secure the active cooperation of Russian leaders while overcoming serious domestic resistance to his plans.1
President Obama developed his plan during his presidential campaign, based on years of cooperative work in the Senate with both Democratic and Republican leaders. Overall, it appears that prospects are improving for sustaining and building a bipartisan consensus around the basic elements of the Obama plan. This is due to several factors, including the increase in the nuclear threats, the failure of previous strategies, the development of new policies, and the commitment of the new president and other state leaders to this new approach. The next twelve to eighteen months will determine if these plans can succeed.